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CROWN AND FOREIGN ACTS OF STATE  
BEFORE BRITISH COURTS:  
RAHMATULLAH, BELHAJ, AND  
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
 
EIRIK BJORGE & CAMERON MILES 
 
 
[T]here exists a particular aspect of that wide topic which in this country, as 
opposed to the United States of America, has been somewhat neglected by 
those interested in first principles, viz. the relationship between the Law and 
the Executive in foreign affairs.  In many respects that relationship has 
developed in a rather haphazard way, in a spirit of subconsciousness and 
inarticulateness.1 
 
Thus wrote FA Mann in 1943, in one of his first writings on a topic related to 
international law.  That piece, originating in a speech given to the Grotius Society and later 
published in its Transactions, formed the basis of Mann’s lifelong interest in the related 
doctrines of Crown and foreign act of state.  One wonders if he considered this interest 
particularly fruitful.  Some five years before his death, he described the wider field of 
foreign affairs in English courts as displaying “much confusion of thought and lack of 
precision, about the reason for which one can only speculate.”2  With the benefit of a further 
quarter-century of jurisprudence and scholarly commentary, it is difficult today to detect 
more than marginal progress from this position. 
 
In two significant judgments during its 2016–17 judicial year—Rahmatullah v. 
Ministry of Defence3 and Belhaj v. Straw4—the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
undertook to demarcate better the relationship between the judiciary and the executive with 
respect to Crown and foreign act of state.  This chapter aims to unpack Rahmatullah and 
Belhaj for the reader and further, in the limited space available, to use these decisions to 
enquire into the constitutional underpinnings of the British act of state doctrines—
particularly as they pertain to the separation of powers.  
 
I.  RAHMATULLAH AND CROWN ACT OF STATE 
 
Rahmatullah concerned actions brought by individuals who claimed to have been 
wrongfully detained or mistreated by British or American troops during the course of the 
conflicts in the early 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Rahmatullah was a Pakistani national 
                                                 
1  F. A. Mann, Judiciary and Executive in Foreign Affairs, 29 GROT. SOC. TRANS. 143 (1943), 
reprinted in F. A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. XI (1973). 
2 F. A. MANN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGLISH COURTS vi (1986). 
3 Rahmatullah v. Ministry of Defence, [2017] 2 WLR 287.. 
4 Belhaj v. Straw, [2017] 2 WLR 458. 
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who had been captured by British forces in Iraq in 2004 and then transported to a American 
detention facility on the same day and transferred to a further American facility in 
Afghanistan, where he was kept until his release in 2014.  He had brought proceedings 
against the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in respect both 
of his treatment at the hands of UK officials and the UK’s alleged complicity in his detention 
and mistreatment while in American custody.  In relation to the second aspect of that claim, 
the UK government raised the defenses of state immunity and foreign act of state.  The 
arguments relating to these defenses were dealt with in Belhaj.   
 
The Rahmatullah case also concerned Mohammed, an Afghan national captured in 
an International Security Assistance Force operation targeting a senior Taliban commander 
on 7 April 2010 and detained by British troops until 25 July 2010, when he was transferred 
into Afghan custody.  He, too, had claimed that his detention was unlawful under both 
Afghan law of tort and the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA 1998”).  The UK Government 
argued that, in relation to the HRA 1998 claim, his detention was not in breach of Article 5 
of the European Convention on Human Rights,5 as Article 5 must be modified to take 
account of detention during armed conflict, which is permitted, either under resolutions of 
the UN Security Council or under international humanitarian law.  The argument concerning 
Article 5 was heard together with a similar argument raised against the Ministry of Defence 
by Waheed, an Iraqi national detained in the course of the conflict in Iraq.6  The claims of 
both Rahmatullah and Mohammed were accompanied by a third class of claims brought by 
certain Iraqi civilians who were detained in Iraq by British forces and, similar to 
Rahmattulah, were then transferred to US custody in purported violation of Iraqi tort law.  
 
The questions pertaining to Crown act of state arose only in connection with the tort 
claims: the human rights claims arising in the proceedings were not subject to the doctrine 
and fell to be determined according to the HRA 1998.7  The Supreme Court thus proceeded 
on the basis that Crown act of state does not run against human rights claims.  This is no 
doubt because, as Lord Bingham held in Gentle, in relation to the deployment of troops in 
Iraq, “if the [claimants] have a legal right it is justiciable in the courts.”8 
  
The majority judgment of the Supreme Court in Rahmatullah was given by Lady 
Hale, with whom Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes expressly agreed.9  Her Ladyship began 
her analysis by asking, “what is this doctrine of Crown act of state?”10  She cited the 
definition given in 1934 by ECS Wade, according to which, “[a]ct of state means an act of 
the Executive as a matter of policy performed in the course of its relations with another 
state, including its relations with the subjects of that state, unless they are temporarily within 
the allegiance of the Crown,”11 a definition that, she observed, had also been cited, albeit 
                                                 
5 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222. 
6 Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence, [2017] 2 WLR 327. 
7 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 17. 
8 R (Gentle) v. Prime Minister, [2008] 1 AC 1356, para. 8.  
9 Lord Neuberger gave a separate judgment that also agreed with Lady Hale’s reasoning, giving her 
Ladyship a majority within the panel.  See Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 106.   
10 Id., para. 2. 
11 E. C. S. Wade, Act of State in English Law: Its Relations with International Law, 15 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 98, 103 (1934). 
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not entirely approvingly, in the leading case of Attorney-General v. Nissan.12  Lady Hale 
took from that decision the important point that, although it was a necessary component of 
the doctrine that the act at issue falls within some such definition, “that does not tell us what 
the doctrine is, or to what rule or rules of law it gives rise.”13 
 
Crown act of state is rarely pleaded, and authority for the doctrine is scant.14  Lady 
Hale felt it necessary, therefore, to go back to the nineteenth century and beyond to set out 
the rationale of the doctrine.15  In that regard, her Ladyship pointed to the fundamental rule 
of English law, dating to Entick v. Carrington,16 that English law “does not recognize that 
there is an indefinite class of acts concerning matters of high policy or public security which 
may be left to the uncontrolled discretion of the Government and which are outside the 
jurisdiction of the courts.”17  She developed this point by reference to the words of Viscount 
Finlay in Johnstone v. Pedlar, according to which: 
 
[I]f a wrongful act has been committed against the person or the property of 
any person the wrongdoer cannot set up as a defence that the act was done 
by the command of the Crown.  The Crown can do no wrong, and the 
Sovereign cannot be sued in tort, but the person who did the act is liable in 
damages, as any private person would be.18 
 
Against this, the question for the Supreme Court was “whether there is indeed a 
qualification such as that expressed by Viscount Finlay and, if so, how far that qualification 
goes.”19  In drawing on the authorities pre-dating A-G v. Nissan, said Lady Hale, it was 
necessary to keep in mind that those were decided “against a legal landscape which was 
very different from the legal landscape of today.”20  Lady Hale stressed that: 
 
The conduct of foreign affairs, making treaties, making peace and war, 
conquering or annexing territories, are all aspects of the Royal prerogative. 
Until the decision of the House of Lords in Council of the Civil Service 
Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (the GCHQ case), the 
general position was that the courts would review whether what had been 
done fell within the scope of the Royal prerogative but would not review 
how that prerogative had been exercised.  After that case, the exercise of 
executive power might be excluded from the scope of judicial review, not 
                                                 
12 A-G v. Nissan [1970] AC 179, 212 (Lord Reid), 218 (Lord Morris), 231 (Lord Wilberforce). 
13 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 2. 
14 Cf. Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 AC 262; A-G v. Nissan, [1970] AC 179; Al-Jedda v. Secretary 
of State for Defence (No 2), [2011] QB 773. 
15 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 3. 
16 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 St Tr 1029. 
17 H. STREET, GOVERNMENT LIABILITY:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 50 (1953). 
18 Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 AC 262, 271. 
19 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 7. 
20 Id., para. 15. 
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because of its source, whether statute or the prerogative, but because of its 
subject matter.21 
 
She also made the point that the pre-Nissan cases were largely decided against the backdrop 
of the principle that “the King can do no wrong,” it having being impossible at that time to 
sue the King in his own courts.  The Crown Proceedings Act 1947 abolished the general 
immunity of the Crown from liability in tort, enabling litigants to sue Government 
departments, and not only their servants, such as the defendants in Rahmatullah.22  
 
In A-G v. Nissan, Lord Wilberforce had taken the view that the doctrine of Crown 
act of state encompassed two rules.  The first was drawn from the case of Buron v. 
Denman,23 and was: 
 
one which provides a defendant, normally a servant of the Crown, with a 
defence to an act otherwise tortious or criminal, committed abroad, provided 
that the act was authorized or subsequently ratified by the Crown. It is 
established that this defence may be pleaded against an alien, if done abroad, 
but not against a friendly alien if the act was done in Her Majesty’s 
Dominions.  
 
The second rule, Lord Wilberforce said, was 
 
one of justiciability: it prevents British municipal courts from taking 
cognizance of certain acts.  The class of acts so protected has not been 
accurately defined: one formulation is “those acts of the Crown which are 
done under the prerogative in the sphere of foreign affairs” (Wade and 
Phillips’s Constitutional Law, 7th ed. (1956), p. 263).  As regards such acts 
it is certainly the law that the injured person, if an alien, cannot sue in a 
British court and can only have resort to diplomatic protest.  How far this 
rule goes and how far it prevents resort to the courts by British subjects is 
not a matter on which clear authority exists. From the terms of the pleading 
it appears that it is this aspect of the rule upon which the Crown seeks to 
rely.24  
 
Having reviewed the case-law, Lady Hale found that the foundations of the rule in 
Buron v. Denman were “very shaky,”25 and that authority for the core (and arguably 
antecedent) rule of non-justiciability was on the whole far more certain.26  Furthermore, her 
Ladyship said, there were conceptual advantages in confining the doctrine to a rule of non-
justiciability, and holding that the rule in Buron v. Denman was nothing more than a 
                                                 
21 Id., para. 15. 
22 Id., para. 16. 
23 Buron v. Denman, (1848) 2 Exch 167, 154 ER 450.  
24 A-G v. Nissan, [1970] AC 179, 231. 
25 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, paras. 22, 31. 
26 Id., para. 31. 
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necessary corollary of the same.27  Such confinement would, however, require a broad 
concept of non-justiciability: 
 
It would have to encompass aspects of the conduct of military operations 
abroad as well as the high policy decision to engage in them, and perhaps 
also some other aspects of the conduct of foreign relations, even though their 
subject matter was entirely suitable for determination by the court.  It is 
necessary that the courts continue to recognise that there are some acts of a 
governmental nature, committed, abroad, upon which the courts of England 
and Wales will not pass judgment.  They may, of course, have to hear 
evidence and find facts in order to determine whether the acts in question 
fall into that category.  It is also necessary to confine that category within 
very narrow bounds.28 
 
As such, it appears that the division between the rule in Buron v. Denman and the 
wider rule of non-justiciability identified by Lord Wilberforce in A-G v. Nissan remains 
intact post-Rahmatullah.  The latter is, according to Lady Hale, confined to certain decisions 
of “high policy” in the conduct of foreign relations, e.g., the decision to participate in armed 
conflict.  These decisions are deemed to be removed entirely from the court’s adjudicative 
ambit.  The former covers all consequential acts carried out by the departments or agents of 
the Crown in pursuit of that high policy.29  These are not so removed, and may be subjected 
to the ordinary forensic processes of the court, which may then determine that the rule in 
Buron v. Denman applies as a defense to tort or crime.  
 
But this left unresolved the central question of Crown act of state:  the precise 
character of the acts that will attract the protection of the doctrine.  Lady Hale refused to 
identify the relevant category with precision, noting that “[i]t would be unwise for this court 
to attempt a definitive statement of the circumstances in which [Crown act of state] might 
apply.”30  She did, however, provide some general guidance, by noting that the doctrine 
could be raised only in respect of: 
 
a very narrow class of acts: in their nature sovereign acts—the sorts of thing 
that governments properly do; committed abroad; in the conduct of the 
foreign policy of the state; so closely connected to that policy to be necessary 
in pursuing it; and at least extending to the conduct of military operations 
which are themselves lawful in international law (which is not the same as 
saying that the acts themselves are necessarily authorised in international 
law).31 
 
This was further qualified in three significant ways: (a) the doctrine is not of general 
application “to all torts committed against foreigners abroad just because they have been 
authorised or ratified by the British government”; (b) by concession of the Ministry of 
                                                 
27 Cf. id., paras. 47, 65, 69 (Lord Mance). 
28 Id., para. 33.  
29 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 31. 
30 Id., para. 36. 
31 Id., para. 37. 
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Defence, it does not apply to acts of torture or to the mistreatment of prisoners or detainees; 
and (c) it does not apply to expropriation, which can always be the subject of 
compensation.32  The idea of a broad-based public policy exception to the doctrine was 
rejected,33 and the question of the doctrine’s application to a British national left open.34  
Lady Hale held on this basis that the defence applied to all three claims at bar—the appeal 
was accordingly allowed and the matters dismissed. 
 
Lady Hale’s reasoning seems to have been based on the rule in Buron v. Denman 
alone, and sought overtly to limit the doctrine of Crown act of state to the narrowest ambit 
possible while still upholding its existence.  The judgments of Lord Mance and Lord 
Sumption, however, reflect a more searching inquiry, investigating not only the defence to 
tort and crime provided by Buron v. Denman but also the antecedent question of non-
justiciability.35  Lord Mance sought to merge the two rules into a single principle of non-
justiciability, arguing that the continued independence of the rule in Buron v. Denman 
created “unnecessary confusion”36 and that the tort defense was nothing more than the 
logical corollary of the Court’s unwillingness to take cognisance of certain Crown acts, 
reflecting (in particular) its prerogative over foreign affairs.37  Lord Sumption held that the 
division between the two rules should be maintained,38 and further investigated the precise 
character of a qualifying state act.  Both concurring opinions pointed out that the doctrine 
of Crown act of state is rooted in the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in 
particular the reservation of the “paradigm functions of the state,” such as the conduct of 
warfare, to the Crown, so that it would be “incoherent and irrational” for the courts to 
acknowledge the Crown’s power to conduct foreign relations of a certain kind, and at the 
same time treat as civil wrongs acts inherent in its exercise of that power.39 
 
II.   BELHAJ AND FOREIGN ACT OF STATE 
 
The UK Government had in Belhaj relied on the defense of foreign act of state in 
relation to various torts in a case in which Belhaj, a Libyan opponent of Colonel Gaddafi, 
contended that, together with his Moroccan wife, he had been detained at Kuala Lumpur, 
compulsorily rendered to a CIA black site in Thailand, subjected to inhumane treatment, 
and then transported to Libya, where he was tortured.  Also involved in the case was 
Rahmatullah, whose claim for the accessorial liability of the Ministry of Defence for torts 
committed against him by American forces was joined to Belhaj and his wife’s appeal.  As 
in Rahmatullah, the act of state questions arose only in relation to the tort claims; what was 
                                                 
32 Id., para. 36. 
33 Id., paras. 34–35. 
34 Id.,, para. 37. 
35 For further analysis, see Ali Malek & Cameron Miles, International Dimensions, in THE UK 
SUPREME COURT YEARBOOK, VOLUME 8: 2016–2017 JUDICIAL YEAR 447 (Daniel Clarry ed., 2017). 
36 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 47. 
37 Id., paras. 65, 69. See in this regard Jenny Martinez, How National Constitutions Allocate Executive 
and Legislative Power over Foreign Relations, Chapter 7 in this volume. 
38 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 78. 
39 Id., para. 88 (Lord Sumption).  See also id., paras. 50–54 (Lord Mance). 
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at issue was the accessorial liability of certain government agents and the Ministry of 
Defence for torts committed against the claimants by the third states.40  
 
Was the UK Government entitled to rely on the defense of foreign act of state on the 
basis that Belhaj’s claim could not be heard because Malaysia, Thailand, the United States, 
and Libya would be impleaded and their legal position affected, whether directly or 
indirectly?  Although the primary actor was the United States, there was no basis for 
concluding that the issues would involve sovereign, international, or inter-state 
considerations of such a nature that a domestic court could not or should not appropriately 
adjudicate upon them.41  The mere fact that an individual is handed over to a state under an 
agreement could not suffice to make the claims for alleged wrongful detention combined 
with severe mistreatment by the United States non-justiciable in respect of either the United 
States’ primary, or the United Kingdom’s ancillary, involvement.42  It was accepted that 
“detention overseas as a matter of considered policy during or in consequence of an armed 
conflict and to prevent further participation in an insurgency could in some circumstances 
constitute a foreign act of state, just as it may constitute Crown act of state when undertaken 
by the United Kingdom.”43  But it was pointed out that the court was concerned, in Belhaj, 
with allegations of arbitrary detention with a view to the individual being forcibly handed 
over to an arbitrary ruler:  
 
Even if one could say that such treatment reflects some policy of the various 
foreign states involved, or indeed of the United Kingdom, it goes far beyond 
any conduct previously recognised as requiring judicial abstention.  There is 
certainly also no lack of judicial and manageable standards by which to judge 
it.44 
 
In relation to indirect impleading, the Supreme Court rejected the Government’s 
argument based on the Monetary Gold doctrine,45 that is, the international law doctrine 
according to which an international tribunal will declare inadmissible a claim the very 
subject-matter of which requires a determination of the rights or interests of a state that is 
not before the court.46  The argument was rejected on the grounds that “Monetary Gold is 
not about state immunity, and does not on its facts assist on the issue now before the court, 
even by way of analogy.”47  The Court did so in spite of the Government48 having adduced 
authorities to the effect that the Monetary Gold doctrine “is the nearest direct analogue in 
                                                 
40 Belhaj, supra note 4, paras. 1 (Lord Mance), 113 (Lord Neuberger), 175 (Lord Sumption).  See 
also Malek & Miles, supra note 35, at 448–53. 
41 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 96. 
42 Id., para. 96. 
43,Id., para. 96. 
44 Id., para. 97. 
45 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, UK and US), [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 
32–3. 
46 See JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
158-61 (1999). 
47 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 27 (Lord Mance). 
48 Joint Case for the Appellants, 24 July 2015, paras. 39–40. 
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international law to the rule of State immunity,”49 with the significant addition that, 
“although the international rule prohibiting adjudication against foreign States without their 
consent may not apply directly to municipal courts, it has much force as an analogy.”50  The 
Court’s approach was clearly correct:  notwithstanding certain theoretical parallels, in the 
final balance, the Monetary Gold doctrine considers the indirectly impleaded interests of a 
third state to be a question of admissibility arising from the consensual character of 
international jurisdiction (ratione voluntatis); the rule has nothing to do with the 
jurisdictional immunity of states (ratione personae) before domestic courts.  As such, 
however inventive the argument, the Court gave it short shrift, pointing out that if correct it 
could be used to remove a court’s jurisdiction (ratione materiae) in any case where state 
interests could be indirectly raised.51 
 
As with Crown act of state, the parameters of foreign act of state can be uncertain.52 
Again, one of the more authoritative earlier statements of the doctrine was given by Lord 
Wilberforce, in Buttes Gas v. Hammer.  Two limbs of the doctrine were identified.  The first 
limb involves questions deriving from cases such as Luther v. Sagor,53 which were: 
 
concerned with the applicability of foreign municipal legislation within its 
own territory, and with the examinability of such legislation—often, but not 
invariably arising in cases of confiscation of property.  Mr Littman gave us a 
valuable analysis of [the relevant cases], suggesting that these are cases 
within the area of conflict of laws, concerned essentially with the choice of 
the proper law to be applied.54 
 
The second limb involves the question of: 
 
whether . . . there exists in English law a more general principle that the courts 
will not adjudicate upon the transactions of foreign sovereign states. Though 
I would prefer to avoid argument on terminology, it seems desirable to 
consider the principle, if existing, not as a variety of “act of state,” but one 
for judicial restraint or abstention .  . . .  This principle is not one of discretion, 
but is inherent in the very nature of the judicial process . . . I find the principle 
clearly stated that the courts in England will not adjudicate upon acts done 
abroad by virtue of sovereign authority.55 
 
                                                 
49 James Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune 
Transactions, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 75, 80 (1983). 
50 Id., at 80–81. 
51 Belhaj, supra note 4, paras. 30 (Lord Mance), 196 (Lord Neuberger).  
52 See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 523-45 (2014). 
53 Aksionairnoye Obschestvo AM Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 KB 532. 
54 Buttes Gas and Oil Co. & Another v. Hammer & Another (No 3), [1982] AC 888, 931A. 
55 Id., at 931G–932A.   
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In developing the category of restraint, the House of Lords in Buttes Gas was drawing on 
influences from the courts of the United States,56 especially Baker v. Carr57 and Goldwater 
v. Carter.58  Not mentioned by Lord Wilberforce in Buttes Gas v. Hammer in conjunction 
with the first rule was the closely allied notion that a British court will not question a foreign 
executive act—as distinct from legislation—on its own territory.  This derived not from 
Luther v. Sagor but another case, Princess Paley Olga.59 
 
Three fully reasoned judgments were delivered in Belhaj: by Lord Mance, Lord 
Sumption, and Lord Neuberger.  Lord Mance gave the first judgment and set out the facts—
an arrangement that traditionally identifies a judgment as that of the majority.  Lord Mance’s 
judgment was, however, a minority judgment, as none of the other justices agreed with his 
reasoning in its entirety.  Rather, Lord Wilson, Lady Hale, and Lord Clarke agreed with 
Lord Neuberger—whose judgment and reasoning accordingly speaks for the majority by 
dint of simple arithmetic.60  To the extent that Lord Neuberger endorsed the reasoning of 
Lord Mance and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Hughes agreed), that endorsement also 
formed part of the ratio. 
 
Lord Neuberger disaggregated act of state into “four rules”—or, rather, four 
potential rules.  The first two reflected the private international law rules of Luther v. Sagor 
and Princess Paley Olga, whereby a British court will not adjudicate on the validity of a 
foreign law or executive act on its own territory in connection with moveable or immoveable 
property.61  The third rule was the second principle of non-justiciability identified by Lord 
Wilberforce in Buttes Gas v. Hammer, whereby British courts will not interpret or question 
sovereign dealings of or between states.62  The fourth rule (which, in fairness, was not the 
subject of argument before the Court and was in fact expressly denounced by both parties) 
was derived from a remark of Rix LJ in Yukos v. Rosneft, whereby “courts will not 
investigate acts of a foreign state where such an investigation would embarrass the 
government of our own country”63—though this could only arise upon a communication of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.64  Lord Neuberger explained that the fourth rule 
had no clear basis in any judicial decision from the UK, and that if a member of the executive 
was to say formally to a court that the judicial determination of an issue could embarrass 
the Government’s relation with another state, the court would not be bound to refuse to 
determine the issue: “[t]hat would involve the executive dictating to the judiciary, which 
                                                 
56 See Lord Mance, Justiciability, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. (forthcoming).   
57 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).   
58 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979).   
59 Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 KB 718. 
60 This understanding of Belhaj has since been adopted by the High Court of England and Wales, in 
AAA v. Unilever plc, [2017] EWHC 371 (QB), para. 36 (Laing J). 
61 Belhaj, supra note 4, paras. 121–22.  For the American approach to similar rules, see Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); see also William S. Dodge, International Comity 
in Comparative Perspective, Chapter 39 in this volume. 
62 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 123. 
63 Yukos Capital SARL v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2), [2014] QB 458, [65]. 
64 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 124. 
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would be quite unacceptable.”65  The end result was that only the first three of Lord 
Neuberger’s rules were held to be part of the positive law. 
 
As pointed out by Bill Dodge,66 in American law the doctrine is by way of 
comparison limited to “the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own 
territory.”67  But the American version of the doctrine has no public policy exception: if it 
is found that the doctrine applies, then an American court is bound to accepts its validity 
“[h]owever offensive to the public policy of this country” it may be.68 
 
As with Crown act of state, this analysis left the substantive application of foreign 
act of state to be decided.  Three questions were of relevance, namely (1) the jurisprudential 
underpinnings of the doctrine, (2) the type of state acts rendered non-justiciable by its 
operation, and (3) the scope and character of any public policy exception thereto.  
    
With respect to (1), Lord Neuberger did not delve into the underpinning of foreign 
act of state in anything more than a transitory sense, but expressed some agreement with 
both Lords Mance and Sumption, who were more expansive on the point.69  As to questions 
(2) and (3), Lord Neuberger said that “it would be unwise to be too prescriptive about [the 
doctrine’s] ambit,” although he made some reference to the fact that “in practice, it will 
almost always apply to actions involving more than one state” and “involve some sort of 
comparatively formal, relatively high level arrangement.”70  With respect to the scope of 
the public policy exception,71 Lord Neuberger applied the same standard as in relation to 
the first (private international law) rule, noting that the exception depended “ultimately on 
domestic law considerations, although generally accepted norms of international law are 
plainly capable of playing a decisive role.”72  In the final balance, his Lordship held that the 
types of act alleged by both claimants would not attract the doctrine’s protection—and, even 
if they did, the public policy exception would apply.73 
 
Rather more clarity was provided by the separate opinions of Lord Mance and Lord 
Sumption, although their Lordships seemed to differ with Lord Neuberger—and with each 
other—on several points of principle.  Lord Sumption set out the clearest view of foreign 
act of state, holding that the rule was confined to acts jure imperii (with that term bearing 
                                                 
65 Id., para. 149. 
66 William S. Dodge, The UK Supreme Court’s Landmark Judgment Belhaj v. Straw: A View from 
the United States, JUST SECURITY (19 January 2017), at https://www.justsecurity.org/36507/uk-supreme-
courts-landmark-judgment-belhaj-v-straw-view-united-states/. 
67 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). 
68 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436 (1964).  But cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 
F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that it is doubtful that acts of a state official committed “in violation of a 
nation’s fundamental law and wholly unratified by that nation’s government, could properly be characterized 
as an act of state”). 
69 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 151. 
70 Id., para. 147. 
71 This was already well-established as an exception to foreign act of state in English law.  See 
Oppenheimer v. Cattermole (Inspector of Taxes), [1976] AC 249, 278B–C (Lord Cross).   
72 Belhaj, paras. 153–57. 
73 Id., paras. 167–68.  
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the same meaning as it did in relation to questions of state immunity)74 and was not solely 
concerned with armed conflict but “altogether more general,” concluding that “[o]nce the 
acts alleged are into the ‘area of an international dispute’ the act of state doctrine is 
engaged.”75  On this basis, both claims in Belhaj were prima facie precluded by foreign act 
of state.76  He further held that the public policy exception, while remaining strictly domestic 
in character, was to be guided by reference to international law, and in particular whether 
the conduct alleged would violate jus cogens norms.77  Citing the 2012 Report of United 
Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on the matter,78 Lord Sumption held that 
“the irreducible core of the international obligation . . . [is] that detention is unlawful it if is 
without any legal basis or recourse to the courts.”79  He then concluded that the acts alleged 
by the claimants in Belhaj—encompassing torture, unlawful detention, enforced 
disappearance and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment—were subject to the exception 
as they violated peremptory norms of international law and fundamental principles of the 
administration of justice in England.80 
 
In Lord Mance’s view, the critical point was:  
 
the nature and seriousness of the misconduct alleged in both cases before the 
Supreme Court, at however high a level it may have been authorised.  Act of 
state is and remains essentially a domestic law doctrine, and it is English law 
which sets its limits. English law recognises the existence of fundamental 
rights, some long-standing, others more recently developed.81  
 
To that end, his Lordship cited Abbasi, where in the context of a claim judicially to review 
the Secretary of State for alleged inaction in respect of the plight of a British citizen detained 
at Guantanamo, the Court of Appeal observed that “where fundamental human rights are in 
play, the courts of this country will not abstain from reviewing the legitimacy of the actions 
of a foreign sovereign state.”82  On the whole, however, Lord Mance did not speak in terms 
of principles (i.e., the act of state) versus exceptions (i.e., public policy), but rather held that 
public policy might persuade or dissuade a court from declaring a matter non-justiciable, 
                                                 
74 Id., para. 199. 
75 Id., para. 234. 
76 Id., para. 238. 
77 Id., para. 257. 
78 UN Doc. No. A/HRC/22/44 (24 December 2012), paras. 38–39. 
79 Belhaj, supra note 4, paras. 270–71. 
80 Id., paras. 238–80]. 
81 Id., para. 98.  Similarly, it has been argued in the American literature that the act of state doctrine 
is not a doctrine of international law but one of international comity, the latter describing “an internationally 
oriented body of domestic law that is distinct from international law and yet critical to legal relations with 
other countries.”  William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2077 
(2015). 
82 R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, 
[53]. 
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and that there was no presumption that a court would abstain in respect of any particular 
state act.83  
 
The appeals were upheld and the matters remitted to the High Court for trial. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The cases of Rahmatullah and Belhaj presented the Supreme Court with a unique 
opportunity.  The Court was confronted with doctrines that had been historically bedeviled 
with uncertainty and that the most authoritative statements on both had been given 
comparatively long ago by Lord Wilberforce in A-G v. Nissan (1970) and Buttes Gas v. 
Hammer (1982).  Furthermore, Lord Wilberforce was not so fortunate as to be able to deal 
with both aspects of act of state simultaneously and in the context of cases that shared 
considerable factual DNA.  The Court was clearly aware of its good fortune and arranged 
itself accordingly.  The same panel of seven Justices sat in each, and the decisions were 
clearly drafted and intended to be read together—indeed, they were handed down seriatim 
on the same day. 
 
While the two judgments do provide clarity in certain vital respects, the upshot of 
Rahmatullah and Belhaj is that aspects of both doctrines and the relationship between them 
remain obscure.  The obscurities concern both questions of the internal coherence of each 
doctrine, and also their external justification as a matter of constitutional principle. 
 
Internal Coherence: Clarifying the Operation of the Act of State Doctrines 
 
The difficulties identified by many commentators with respect to the act of state 
doctrines are summed up admirably by Lord Reid’s aside in A-G v. Nissan: “a good deal of 
trouble has been caused by using the loose phrase ‘act of state’ without making clear what 
is meant.”84  This comment is almost as apt post-Rahmatullah and Belhaj as it was in 1970.  
In neither case was clear direction given as to precisely which acts of state would be 
protected from judicial scrutiny.  At the highest level, both doctrines may be said to apply 
to “acts which are by their nature sovereign acts, acts which are inherently governmental, 
committed to the conduct of the foreign relations [of the Crown or state in question].”85  The 
scope of such acts have been delineated extensively in public international law by the rules 
on state immunity, which serve as a useful analogy.86  Less certain is the outer limit of the 
doctrine.  In Rahmatullah, Lady Hale held that the rule in Buron v. Denman protects acts 
“so closely connected to [the foreign policy of the state] as to be necessary in pursuing 
it”87—with no explanation given as to what might be considered “necessary” in that 
context.88  
                                                 
83 Belhaj, supra note 4, paras. 89–90.  
84 A-G v. Nissan, [1970] AC 179, 211G. 
85 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. [36] (Lady Hale).  
86 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 199 (Lord Sumption). 
87 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 37.  See also id., paras. 56–58 (Lord Sumption), 64 (Lord Mance), 
88–93 (Lord Sumption). 




At the same time, useful clarification was provided with respect to other aspects of 
the act of state doctrines.  The extraterritorial aspect of Crown act of state was confirmed, 
as was the dual territorial (in the cases of the principle of Luther v. Sagor and Princess Paley 
Olga) and extraterritorial (in the case of Buttes Gas v. Hammer non-justiciability) of foreign 
act of state.  Also confirmed as removed (or diminished) was the dictum of Lord Wilberforce 
in Buttes Gas v. Hammer that a further case for non-justiciability when considering a foreign 
act of state is a lack of “judicial or manageable standards” on which to found a decision.89  
This abnegation of a British court’s decision to apply international law—trenchantly 
criticized when handed down,90 but in reality always blown somewhat out of proportion—
was deemed to be irrelevant in Belhaj.91  Given the relative development and wider 
acceptance of international law by British courts since Buttes Gas v. Hammer was decided, 
the utility of that dictum has likely been reduced to the vanishing point.  
 
Nevertheless, areas of uncertainty remain in respect of both act of state doctrines 
that disrupt their internal coherence.  This may well have been by design, the Supreme Court 
in both cases having seemed cognizant of the risk of over-precision in relation to the act of 
state doctrines.  Lady Hale noted that “[i]t would be unwise for this court to attempt a 
definitive statement of the circumstances in which [Crown act of state] might apply.”92  Lord 
Neuberger urged a similar caution with respect to foreign act of state.93  This political aspect 
serves as a neat link between questions pertaining to the internal coherence of the act of 
state doctrines and their wider (or external) justification from the perspective of 
constitutional principle. 
 
External Coherence: Rooting the Act of State Doctrines in Constitutional Principle 
 
The greatest principled advance in Rahmatullah and Belhaj was confirmation by the 
Supreme Court that the doctrines of Crown and foreign act of state arise from something 
approximating a common constitutional source. 
 
The Court was at pains in both cases to stress the increasing importance of the 
principles of the constitutional division of power in the act of state analysis.  Further and in 
addition, the relationship between the branches of power under the constitution goes some 
way in explaining the difference in outcome in Belhaj and Rahmatullah.  In his judgment in 
Rahmatullah, Lord Mance observed that it would be wrong to suggest that the principle of 
abstention identified by Lord Wilberforce in A-G v. Nissan and Buttes Gas v. Hammer 
applies with the same force or by reference to the same considerations in relation to the two 
types of act of state: 
 
                                                 
89 Buttes Gas v. Hammer, [1982] AC 888, 938B. 
90 See, e.g., James Crawford, Public International Law, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 253, 268 (1982); J. G. 
Collier, Transactions Between States—Non-Justiciability—International Law and the House of Lords in a 
Judicial No-Man’s Land, 41 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 18, 18–21 (1982). 
91 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 90. 
92 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 36. 
93 Belhaj, supra note 4, para. 101. 
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Both Crown act of state and the third type of foreign act of state are based on 
an underlying perception of the role of domestic courts. The constitutional 
relationship of a domestic court with its own State differs from its relationship 
with that of any foreign sovereign state.  Crown act of state is reserved for 
situations of sovereign authority exercised overseas as a matter of state 
policy.  In these circumstances, a straight-forward principle of consistency 
directly underpins Crown act of state . . . .  In contrast, if and when the third 
type of foreign act of state applies, its underpinning is a more general 
conception of the role of a domestic court, and, more particularly, the 
incongruity of a domestic court adjudicating upon the conduct of a foreign 
sovereign state, even though the foreign state is neither directly or indirectly 
impleaded or affected in its rights. . . .  [I]t must be easier to establish that a 
domestic court should abstain from adjudicating on the basis of Crown act of 
state than on the basis of the third type of foreign act of state.  The relationship 
is closer and the threshold of sensitivity lower in the case of the former than 
the latter.94  
 
Lord Mance’s comments—echoed by Lord Sumption95—make it clear that although 
the doctrines may prima facie encompass the same class of acts, the different origins of each 
may compel a different result.  Foreign act of state is based on a nebulous but elemental 
conception of how a domestic court operates, and contemplates that there are some 
substantive questions in respect of which the court is not incompetent to issue an opinion, 
but from which is should nevertheless refrain.  Crown act of state, on the other hand, is 
animated by a more hard-edged rule drawn from the relationship of the judiciary to the 
executive in a constitutional democracy.  This explains the additional degree of caution 
animating the Court in Rahmatullah and the absence from Crown act of state of the defined 
public policy exception that was the subject of extended discussion in Belhaj.96 
   
In other words, with respect to Crown act of state, it would be inconsistent for the 
common law to give, with the one hand, the function of deploying armed force in the 
conduct of international relations to the executive only to take away, with the other, by 
treating as civil wrongs the acts carried out by the executive in that connection.  The 
argument is similar to that which was taken to be good law in relation to judicial review and 
the Royal prerogative until the landmark GCHQ judgment in the mid-1980s, which 
confirmed the reviewability by the judiciary of the prerogative.97  In addition to confirming 
that the exercise of the prerogative could be reviewed, the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords in GCHQ established that justiciability depended on the subject matter 
rather than on the source of the power; the fact that a case concerns the exercise of the 
prerogative would not automatically take the act or omission out of the scope of judicial 
review.98 Lord Mance explicitly pointed out the connection with GCHQ.99 
                                                 
94 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, paras. 50–52. 
95 Id., para. 88. 
96 Malek & Miles, supra note 35, at 462–63. 
97 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374. 
98 R (Abbasi and Juma) v. Foreign Secretary, (2002) 123 ILR 599, 605–06, para. 14 (Richards J). 
99 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, para. 56. 
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The old orthodoxy was that, as Sir William Wade put it, “the logical basis for ‘act 
of state’” was geography: “the Crown enjoys no dispensation for acts done within the 
jurisdiction, whether the plaintiff be British or foreign; but foreign parts are beyond the pale 
(in Kipling’s words, ‘without the law’).”100  As will have been seen, the perspective has 
changed from one of geography—foreign parts having been considered beyond the pale—
to one of constitutional competence as regards subject matter, some matters being “beyond 
the constitutional competence assigned to the courts under our conception of the separation 
of powers.” 
 
This is a welcome development.  Sir Philip Sales argued more than a decade ago that 
it would assist the rational development of the law in relation to the act of state doctrine for 
separation of powers type analysis to be brought more to the forefront of the courts’ 
reasoning, so that the competing interests and policy considerations might be balanced more 
explicitly and coherently.101  Viewing the act of state doctrine through the prism of 
separation of powers would lead to the suggestion that the doctrine should, as compared to 
its traditional version, be qualified to some extent.102  This is indeed what is happening.  
Prefiguring this move, Lauterpacht observed that, already in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, one was seeing a gradual development where “the doctrine of separation of powers 
is being in practice reduced to its proper proportions.”103  Some decades later Lord 
Sumption, speaking extra-judicially, echoed this important point, referring to the developing 
framework as “the advance of the qualified division of powers theory.”104  There is no doubt 
that, in the delimitation of executive power in foreign affairs before British courts, the 
development of the law is aided by the concept of the separation of powers, and that the 
principle of constitutional separation of powers is a qualified one as compared with the 
principle that operated in the twentieth century.  The separation of powers is no longer only 
a byword for judicial abstention and the executive enjoying a free reign in foreign affairs. 
 
This may be said to apply with respect to Crown act of state.  Important questions 
still persist, however, in respect of its foreign counterpart.  Historically, the jurisprudential 
underpinning of the doctrine—at least insofar as it reflected a principle of judicial 
abstention—was, as a matter of English law, unclear.  When Mann came to the topic for the 
first time in 1943,105 he asserted that it was based upon mere rhetoric, and was reflective of 
policy preferences that could not be justified as a matter of constitutional principle.  As such, 
it carried little more weight than a legal maxim—a category of aphorism that he considered 
dangerous, and despised accordingly.106  
 
                                                 
100 HWR Wade, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 230 (1961). 
101 Philip Sales, Act of State and the Separation of Powers, 11 JUDICIAL REVIEW 94, 97 (2006). 
102 Id. at 94. 
103 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 398 (1933) 
(emphasis added). 
104 Lord Sumption, Foreign Affairs in the English Courts since 9/11, at 8 (Lecture given at the London 
School of Economics, 14 May 2012). 
105 MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 455–65. 
106 Id., at 420–22. 
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In returning to foreign act of state some four decades later, Mann did not consider 
the situation to have improved.  He drew an unfavourable comparison between the 
development that had occurred with respect to the equivalent doctrine in the United States, 
tracking a jurisprudential shift from an analysis that prioritized comity between states to one 
that prioritized comity between branches of government.107  In this, he cited Judge Brieant’s 
remarks in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust, that: 
 
Historically [courts under the foreign act of state doctrine] should respect the 
acts of foreign sovereigns conducted within their borders . . . .  That has since 
been refined and the doctrine is now cited more as a means of maintaining 
the proper balance between the judicial and political branches of the 
government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.108 
 
Mann then went on to note that no such jurisprudential justification had been 
advanced in English law—indeed, it had been denied in other, related fields.109  Lord 
Mance’s principled justification of the division between Crown and foreign act of state may 
now be said to provide that underpinning.  But it does so only up to a point.  His Lordship’s 
language, referring to “a more general conception of the role of a domestic court, and, more 
particularly, the incongruity of a domestic court adjudicating upon the conduct of a foreign 
sovereign state,”110 is couched in terms broadly redolent of the separation of powers, it is 
true.  But one may ask whether, beyond identifying the constitutional space in which the 
rule is said to operate, Lord Mance has shed any light upon its basis in anything other than 
the most general of terms.  From where does this “general conception” arise?  Is it rooted in 
precedent?  Is it of relevance elsewhere in English law?  And why exactly is a domestic 
court sitting in judgment over a foreign state’s acts—in circumstances where the hard rules 
of state immunity do not apply—so incongruous anyway?  In this, his Lordship may be said 
to have done little more than coin yet another of Mann’s dreaded maxims, in respect of 
which Lord Wright famously said: 
 
[T]hese general formulae are found in experience often to distract the court’s 
mind from the actual exigencies of the case, and so to induce the court to 
quote them as offering a ready-made solution.  It is not yet safe to act upon 
them, however, unless, and to the extent that, they received definition and 
limitation, from judicial determination.111 
 
Given the vagueness with which Lord Mance expressed himself, the “definition and 
limitation” that Lord Wright required before he could deem a maxim safe to act upon is not 
yet present.  As such, from a certain point of view, the opportunity presented to the Supreme 
Court by Rahmatullah and Belhaj—being the opportunity to articulate the place of these 
doctrines within the UK’s constitutional framework—has been wasted.  But perhaps not 
completely.  In at least identifying the basic root of the doctrine and, to a degree, sketching 
                                                 
107 MANN, supra note 2, at 176.  See Dodge, supra note 61.  
108 Banco Nactional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust, 594 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (SDNY, 
1984). 
109 MANN, supra note 2, at 176. 
110 Rahmatullah, supra note 3, paras. [50]–[52]. 
111 Lissenden v. Bosch Ltd., [1940] AC 412, 435. 
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out its relationship with Crown act of state, Lord Mance may be said to have wrestled the 
English conception of foreign act of state onto a recognized jurisprudential base.  As Sir 
Philip Sales noted, this is eminently desirable—and may now serve as a seed from which 
more articulated judicial thoughts may grow.112  One hopes that the Supreme Court will not 
need to wait another thirty-five years to tackle the subject. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has attempted to provide a synthesis and criticism of the UK Supreme 
Court’s judgments in Rahmatullah and Belhaj, and to contextualize both within the wider 
doctrines of Crown and foreign act of state, as applied by British courts.  In the final balance, 
many of the criticisms made by Mann in 1986 may be said to apply today: a general 
uncertainty regarding the scope of the doctrines, and a lack of jurisprudential development 
with respect to their constitutional underpinnings (an observation that rings particularly true 
with respect to foreign act of state).  But it is undeniable that progress, however minor, has 
been made in these decisions.  While the act of state doctrines in English law are not yet as 
clear and hard-edged as their American counterparts, the scene has been set in Rahmatullah 
and Belhaj for further developments—even if litigants will still need to refer to the earlier 
case law (and particularly the remarks of Lord Wilberforce in A-G v. Nissan and Buttes Gas 
v. Hammer) in order to get the full picture.  
 
                                                 
112 Sales, supra note 101, at 97. 
